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Depreciation has long been considered by the accounting community as a fact of life 
and because of that (or in spite of it), systematic studies of depreciation have received 
little attention in Europe (Burlaud et al., 1996: 300). This has not been the case in 
Australia and US. In Australia there was an interesting debate around possible 
explanations for changes in share prices associated with companies reporting 
depreciation of buildings qualifications (Ball et al., 1979: 26; Clinch, 1983; Craswell, 
1986). This debate raised key issues for accounting research including the assessment 
of whether a strict allocation of economic costs is being applied as well as the 
practical implications of implementing a true and fair view.   
In the US possibilities for changes in depreciation policy to manipulate 
reported earnings have been explored within manufacturing and public utilities (e.g. 
Comiskey, 1971; Dye and Magee, 1991; Czaja, 1995; Barth et al., 2001; Ibrahim, 
2005). These studies investigated the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows 
and emphasised the exploration of the impact of capital expenditure on stock market 
performance. In these studies, ‘depreciation expense is normally not a material 
amount for [US] banking companies’ (Walther, 1982: 380). As a result, banks and 
other financial service organisation have been excluded from the analysis of 
discretionary accruals. However, investigating the role of accruals is of relevance for 
the history of financial service organisations because ‘tax policy and depreciation 
profoundly influenced the timing of when companies acquired large computers, which 
were capital- intensive investments’ (Cortada, 2004: 23).  
Research in this paper addresses the otherwise neglected topic of the impact of 
fixed asset depreciation on the reported earnings on financial service organizations. 
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The article reports research that departs from the traditional analysis of the 
manipulation of financial reports in the context of stock market efficiency. This by 
looking at the change of the rate of depreciation of freehold buildings by directors of 
an English building society in the context of new regulation. The year 1959 was a 
turning point for UK building societies. In that year many societies obtained 
Government recognition in two forms: ‘their deposits became authorized trustee 
investments and building societies became entitled, for the first time in their long 
history, to borrow from H. M. Government.’1 The changes introduced between 1959 
and 1962 were the first general alteration of the legislative code for building societies 
since 1894 and were accompanied by the introduction of a minimum net reserve ratio 
(of 2.5 per cent of net assets at the end of 1960) and a minimum liquidity requirement 
(of 7.5 per cent of total assets at the end of 1960).  
After some dispensations, of the 732 registered societies in December 1960, 
there were 218 societies (including four non-members of the Building Societies 
Association) whose assets had been designated as one in which trustees may deposit 
trust funds. The sum of total assets of these 218 societies was estimated at 
£2,994,000,000, equivalent to 94% of the assets of all registered societies at the end of 
1960 (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1961: 6). Research in this article examines one 
of the societies that qualified for trustee status: The Co-operative Permanent Building 
Society (CPBS) and in particular, the decision of its directors to change the rate of 
asset depreciation (and thus achieve the required level of net reserves in 1960) but, 
notably, without making any notification in the financial statements.  
The move by the Board of the CPBS is analysed in terms of issues against the 
decision by the directors, that is, in favour of qualification of the audit report; and 
issues in favour of the decision by the directors, that is, against qualification of the 
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audit report. These issues included consistency of depreciation policy, transparency, 
responsibility to stakeholders, impairment, materiality/immateriality of amount being 
adjusted, possibilities of long-term problems, and others (i.e. potential private 
considerations of auditors and possibilities for liability management in the 1960s).  
In summary, this article sheds light on the strategic response of a UK financial 
intermediary when regulatory change curtailed its growth opportunities. The evolving 
nature of accounting policy and strategic decision-making are the motivation for 
analysing this case with an historical perspective. Rather than providing an 
explanatory hypothesis to a problem, research in this article aims to analyse the 
financial implications of accounting practices and show how and why those practices 
emerged in their respective historical contexts. Central to these explanations is 
providing a detailed examination of managers’ concerns about the effects of an audit 
report qualification on stakeholder evaluation of their performance. 
The reminder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section details 
possibilities for asset management at building societies in the decades that followed 
the Second World War. In this context, regulatory change chiefly aimed to modify the 
behaviour of building societies by altering their asset management practices. This 
section also details the standard practice for the depreciation of fixed assets in Britain 
as well as disclosure requirements for building societies. The third section deals with 
the introduction of a minimum reserve requirement for building societies as part of 
their designation for trustee status and in the context of housing policy during the 
1950s. The fourth section presents the response of the Co-operative Permanent to the 
new regulation. The fifth section discusses the accounting implications of a change in 
the depreciation policy as part of the CPBS response to the new regulatory regime and 
ascertains why it was possible for CPBS’s directors and auditors to proceed without  
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notifying the change of depreciation policy in the financial statements. The sixth and 
final section offers tentative conclusions and points to possibilities for further 
research. 
Asset management and depreciation in building societies, 1950-1970  
Asset management in the 1950s and 1960s 
The history and performance of building societies in the twentieth century has been 
documented elsewhere (see further Davies, 1981; Boléat, 1986; McKillop and 
Ferguson, 1993; Jeremy, 1998; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). From this history it emerges that 
liquidity management is at the front line of the business of transforming retail deposits 
and ‘share’ investments into long-term financing of house purchases (Perks, 1977: 34-
7; Phillips, 1983; Thygerson, 1995: 254-8).  Liquidity management involves meeting 
liquidity requirements through the management of assets, liabilities or both (i.e. 
portfolio liquidity management). For most of the twentieth century, retail financial 
intermediaries in the UK were constrained to meet short-term liquidity requirements 
through asset management. Before the introduction in 1971 of the package of 
monetary control measures known as ‘Competition and Credit Control’, British retail 
financial intermediaries generally accepted the size and composition of their deposits 
as given (Howells and Bain, 2004: 100). Section 12 of the Building Society Act 1960 
first gave authority, at the instance of the Chief Registrar and with the consent of the 
Treasury, for any one society to lend funds to another society ‘in financial 
difficulties’. This statute was first implemented in October 1960, when the Alliance 
allowed the Barrow-on-Soar to remain liquid through a short-term loan of £100,000 – 
about a third of the Barrow-on-Soar’s total assets.2 But in spite of this provision and 
with the exception of government loans in 1959 and 1974, it was unusual for societies 
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to borrow money other than through deposits and long-term investments called 
‘shares’ (Perks, 1977: 31; Boléat, 1981: 153). The appointment of the so-called Stow 
Committee by the Building Societies Association (BSA) in 1979 was the first time 
societies systematically explored possible sources of finance from wholesale sources 
(Phillips, 1983: 12). Profitability for building societies, during the post-war period, 
thus depended upon the skill with which directors could employ deposits to make 
mortgage advances while keeping an adequate level of cash and liquid investments, 
that is, upon skilful asset management. 
Other potential sources to meet liquidity or capital requirements such as 
decreasing dividend payment or issuing long term debt were outside the strategic 
realm of building societies. Dividend payments (i.e. to ‘share’ investments) followed 
recommended rates by the Building Societies Association and in turn, these were 
loosely tied to the Bank of England’s base interest rate. Regulation overseeing the 
governance of building societies restricted possibilities to issue long-term debt and 
limited the issuing of new ‘shares’ to individual investments of less than £5,000.3 As 
was the case for banks in the UK and US until the late 1960s (Bradley and Crane, 
1975: 2-3; Thygerson, 1995: 259), asset management was thus the dominant method 
to meet the short-term liquidity requirements of building societies.  
In summary, during the 1950s and 1960s it was to be expected that regulatory 
changes (such as those in the Act of 1959) would have their greatest impact on 
building societies by modifying the structure of asset markets through direct 
intervention in the allocation of credit rather than modifying the behaviour of 
participants in those markets indirectly through transactions in open markets.4 
 
 8 
Disclosure requirements for building societies 
Disclosure requirements for building societies date to the Building Society Act 1894 
which gave the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies powers to intervene in the affairs 
of societies and required full accounting disclosure and professional audits (Phillips, 
1983: 4). The Act of 1894 remained the main statute regulating disclosure until 1959, 
when the State Building Society collapsed as a result of its directors making mortgage 
advances, without proper security, for bridging finance in take-over bids to a company 
in which the directors of the State were also directors. This was also called the ‘Jasper 
affair’ and it led to an accelerated introduction of changes to disclosure requirements 
under the Building Society Act 1960 (Sections 38 to 49 Accounts and Audits; Sections 
50 and 51 The Annual Return; Section 58 False entries in documents sent to the Chief 
Registrar). This and all other legislation relevant to building societies were 
subsequently consolidated in the Building Society Act 1962. 
Disclosure requirements under the Act of 1960 were expressed in general 
terms, the emphasis being on the need to present a true and fair view. The changes 
introduced reinforced requirements for the valuation of collateral for mortgage loans 
and, following the ‘Jasper affair’, the disclosure by directors of interests in potential 
conflict with the running of the society’s business.5  
Before putting forward the new statutory instruments regulating disclosure in 
1960, the Chief Registrar took advice from the BSA, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) and the Association of Certified and 
Corporate Accountants as well as considering the views of other interested parties and 
the financial press (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1961: 14). The new statutory 
instruments thus followed general guidelines established in the Companies Act 1948 
that specified items specific to building societies which were otherwise loosely 
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detailed in the Companies Act. Although in many ways the statutory instruments 
made the Building Society Act 1960 more prescriptive than the Companies Act 1948, 
the 1960 Act gave no specific guidelines on depreciation as it simply required 
societies to disclose ‘…the method of arriving at the amount at which any office 
premises were shown in the society’s Annual Return’.6  
Another potential source of details on the disclosure practices of building 
societies was the BSA’s ‘Financial Accounting Procedures’. These ‘Procedures’ 
showed items considered ‘source of great variability between building societies’, such 
as labour costs within ‘Total Management Expenses’.7 However, the BSA guidelines 
explicitly recognised that, behind the apparent simplicity and uniformity in the 
financial statements of building societies, there was a wide range of criteria in the 
application of accounting policies. But the ‘Procedures’ were mute on the issue of 
depreciation of fixed assets. 
In light of the above, it seems that building societies were bound by the 
standard specified in Recommendation IX  (Depreciation of Fixed Assets) of the 
ICAEW, which provided specific guidelines to charge depreciation (reproduced 
verbatim in de Paula, 1957: 328-30), namely: 
a) Goodwill and freehold land should not be depreciated (unless consumed as 
raw material; e.g. mines, oil wells and quarries). 
b) A provision for depreciation of freehold buildings, plant and machinery, tools 
and equipment, leaseholds, transport vehicles and any similar asset should be 
computed on the straight-line method. The provision to be shown in the profit 
and loss statement. The balance sheet should show the estimated unexpired 
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capital outlay of fixed assets, that is, the value of aggregate historical cost of 
the assets less aggregate provisions for depreciation. 
Other methods of depreciation were acknowledged by the ICAEW but 
disregarded as inappropriate (de Paula, 1957: 79-80 and 135). So was the need to 
adjust historical values to reflect the fact that inflation since 1945 had greatly 
increased the replacement costs of fixed assets. One practical difficulty of the straight-
line method was recognized, namely, forecasting when the obsolescence of the asset 
would arise (de Paula, 1957: 139).  
At same time, auditors were duty-bound to test for errors in the calculation of 
provisions but only if these calcula tions were material in amount (Kettle, 1954b: 281; 
de Paula, 1957: 4). Moreover, auditors of building societies were to state, by way of a 
note to the Revenue and Appropriation account or a letter to the Chief Registrar, any 
items affected in every material respect by either (a) transactions of an exceptional or 
non-recurrent nature; or (b) by any change in the basis of accounting.8   
Qualifying the audit report 
The term ‘audit qualification’ is used here to describe clauses which express any type 
of reservation or adverse comment regarding the ‘truth and fairness’ of the financial 
statements. Qualifications should deal with (i) non-observance of statutory 
requirements; and (ii) any respects in which the accounts are, in the opinion of the 
auditors, not true and fair (Kettle, 1954a: 250). Qualifying the accounts could emerge 
from errors or omissions but also from a situation where the management team and 
the auditors have failed to agree on how the company has prepared a specific part of 
the accounts (Kettle, 1954b: 276; de Paula, 1957: 146; Ball et al., 1979: 23). Through 
a qualification the auditor is bringing to the notice of the users of the accounts (i.e. 
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regulators, depositors and in the case of public companies, shareholders) an element 
not present elsewhere and which has material bearing on the financial statements. The 
auditor is not putting forward a criticism but effectively telling the users of the 
accounts that there is a disagreement on how the financial statements have been 
presented. This difference of opinion is vital for the understanding of the financial 
statements. 
Audit qualifications will most likely lead to a revision of the value of the firm 
by stakeholders (Ball et al., 1979: 26; Craswell, 1986: 31). In the early 1970s, the 
most common form of qualification for Australian firms quoted on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange and which continued as a going concern, related to the failure of firms to 
record ‘depreciation of buildings’ as a charge against profits (Ball et al., 1979: 26). 
Reasons outlined in Australia for non-compliance included the time spent disputing 
with auditors (i.e. higher audit fees), the cost to distinguish between building and 
freehold land, increased time for self-audit (i.e. spent on preparation for year end 
audit), possibilities of political intervention, increased possibilities litigation, and 
possible violations of restrictive covenants.  
Although in principle qualifying the accounts could be taken as a serious 
action by the auditors, empirical evidence on the response of shareholders to 
depreciation of buildings qualifications using different samples of firms quoted on the 
Sydney Stock Exchange has shown mixed results (Ball et al., 1979: 27; Clinch, 1983: 
143; Craswell, 1986: 32). However, alternatives for the building societies were 
severely curtailed when compared with a listed company. Their mutual status negated 
any possible access to the stock market while regulation and the incipient 
development of long-term debt markets further constrained external sources of 
finance.  
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As noted by Craswell (1986: 31), Australian managers contemplating audit 
qualifications in the period prior to 1971 had very little experience in the effects of 
qualifications. However, the uncertainty surrounding the effects of qualifications 
would have been reduced as the frequency of qualifications increased during the first 
half of the 1970s.  
In the UK, inconsistencies in the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Ninth Schedule of the Companies Act 1948 were blamed as the source of difficulties 
in distinguishing auditors’ comments (i.e. amplifications) from outright qualifications 
(Kettle, 1954a: 250).  For instance, Kettle (1954b: 277) cites an auditor’s report 
describing an improper depreciation of fixed assets as an exemplar of the 
consequences of obscure qualifications. Unfortunately he fails to discuss whether 
qualifications resulting from doubtful depreciation practices were widespread or not.  
A search of public sources (namely the Times Digital archive) suggested that, 
between January 1950 and December 1970, audit qualifications of UK-based listed 
companies were a ‘news worthy item’ only after 1967.9  
A widespread threat for financial accounts of building societies being qualified 
emerged until October 1978, that is, following the failure of the Grays Building 
Society. Mr Keith Branding, Chief Registrar, and Mr Eric Sayers, President of the 
ICAEW, respectively wrote to societies and their auditors warning them of the lax 
application of the 1962 Act while reminding them of Section 38(2), which made 
specific provision for individual societies to keep (and auditors to examine) a system 
of control, inspection and supervision. 10 Both Mr Branding and Mr Sayers were of the 
view that there was an impending need to reappraise those systems – particularly at 
small societies.   
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Financial reports (Form A.R. 11) of the top five building societies for fiscal 
years between 1951 and 1970, were often accompanied by notes regarding 
extraordinary matters. However, none of the notes and letters from external auditors 
to the Chief Registrar that accompanied A.R. 11 forms criticised or otherwise 
disagreed with the directors of the five biggest building societies.  
Depreciation of freehold property in building societies 
Profit-smoothing seems to have been an important consideration for managers in the 
mid-twentieth century. Depreciation was one tool available when managers wished to 
increase (or decrease) profits, depending upon the prevailing economic conditions. 
Baum (1989; 1993) and Scott (1996) note that such practices remained unchanged 
until the early 1980s, a time that saw a rapid development of interest in the UK in 
property depreciation and obsolescence. According to Edwards (1989), the usual 
practice in mid-twentieth century Britain was to expense all repairs and renewals with 
no regular provision for depreciation. That was indeed the case in the clearing banks 
during the post-war period, which all charged spending on equipment to the profit and 
loss account (Capie and Billings, 2001: 237). Higher spending on equipment (partly 
arising from computerisation) in the 1950s was followed by changes in accounting 
treatment, with Westminster Bank capitalising equipment in 1964 and Lloyds Bank in 
1969 (Capie and Billings, 2001: 237). Evidence documented in Perks (1977) 
suggested a very similar situation at building societies. He offered anecdotal evidence, 
through an informal survey of chief financial officers of building societies, claiming 
that, up to the mid 1970s, societies:  
‘…capitalised everything they could get away with, including some very 
questionable items, in order to minimise the management expense figure. In 
the short term this policy is likely to be successful, but over a period of years 
the amounts capitalised will inevitably be reflected in increased depreciation 
charges.’ (p. 177). Moreover, ‘in 1975 the only society which specifically 
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stated that depreciation was charged on freehold property was the Halifax, the 
rate being 2 per cent per annum on the reducing balance. The other societies 
appear to charge depreciation or amortisation only on those premises which 
are held on short leaseholds… Most property is, however, recorded in the 
books at cost less depreciation; sometimes it is not even possible to arrive at 
the historic cost of the premises because only the net figure is shown.’ (p. 
181). 
Archival evidence thus suggested that accounting guidelines were not effectively 
applied by building societies. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest it was 
standard practice for building societies to depreciate freehold buildings in the 1960s. 
Research in this article goes on to explore the consequences of an apparent change in 
the depreciation formula of the CPBS. This is important because there are cash-flow 
considerations of changing depreciation formulae when such changes affect the rate 
of dividend declared or in the case at hand, the change impacts financial ratios 
(Clinch, 1983: 139). Profit smoothing through changes in the depreciation formula 
has the potential to ‘bias’ reported earnings, departing from the ‘true and fair’ view 
and distorting the usefulness of financial reports to ascertain economic performance.11 
But prior to exploring the manipulation of published financial reports in detail, the 
next section offers the process of change in British housing policy including the 
introduction of reserve requirements for building societies. 
Introduction of minimum reserve requirements in 1959 
Housing policy 
Growth of building society advances took off in the 1920s and accelerated during the 
1930s (Humphries, 1987). Business stagnated for building societies with the advent of 
war as well as Labour’s policies to promote housing by means other than private 
ownership. There is little evidence to suggest the societies were serious candidates for 
nationalisation (Greer, 1974: 19; Boddy, 1980: 16). Instead, Labour governments 
preferred to promote the growth of the housing stock through local authorities, 
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housing associations and imposing restrictions on private lettings. Societies were thus 
primarily financing the purchase of existing dwellings. 
By 1950 most building societies had accumulated substantial liquid assets. At 
the same time, the combination of a government policy antagonistic to private 
ownership, the mortgage rate cartel, together with inflation and low savings rates, 
resulted in unsatisfied demand for mortgage funds.12 A period of growth in the assets 
of building societies followed after the return to government in 1951 of the 
Conservative Party, which was more sympathetic to private ownership. Table 1 
summarises the housing policies of the Tory government in the 1950s. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As a result of the housing policy of the Tory government, the share of building 
society advances grew from 27 per cent of total mortgage transactions in 1920 to 38 
per cent in 1936, to 50 per cent in 1958 (Cleary, 1965: 282). By 1958 there were 755 
societies, with a sum of total assets of £2,407,956,000.13 The top five societies (0.66 
per cent of the total number of societies) together held £1,029,108,000 in assets or 43 
per cent of the overall total for all societies.14 The years 1956, 1957 and 1958 showed 
an average increase of 8 per cent in the total assets of all societies.15 But this growth 
was uneven, as total assets at the top five societies were growing twice as fast than all 
other societies.16 Some of this growth in total assets was due to the amalgamation of 
smaller less liquid societies.17 But, on balance, differences in asset growth suggested 
that larger societies were more effective than smaller societies at capturing market 
share of the expanding British retail mortgage market. Table 2 shows that, in the years 
that followed, the top five societies maintained a healthy average rate of growth in 
mortgage assets of 13 per cent per annum.  
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[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Table 2 also shows that the agreement of 1954 plus subsequent moves by the 
Tory government to promote owner-occupancy benefited building societies. This is 
evident in Panel B of Table 2, which shows that, between 1958 and 1967, the average 
growth of mortgage assets for the top five societies was 208 per cent. Between 1950 
and 1967, mortgage assets averaged 83 per cent of total assets of the top five 
societies. 
However, the 1954 agreement left at a disadvantage those people who wanted 
to buy a house built before 1919.  In  order to address this the government proposed 
making further advances through building societies. Building societies agreed to take 
on the added risk but in return secured the designation of their deposit as trustee 
investment.18 Securing trustee status was important because without it and in the 
absence of specific testamentary directions, the trustee of an estate was required to 
disinvest from building societies. These arrangements were given legal effect in the 
Housing and House Purchase Act 1959.19 
Housing and House Purchase Act 1959  
Although the intent of the Government was to promote owner-occupancy, co-
operation with the building societies under the Housing Act threatened to accelerate 
growth of their assets to an undesirable rate. Provisions were then introduced to keep 
that growth under control. Section 1 of the House Purchase and Housing Act 1959 
empowered Sir Cecil Crabbe, the Chief Registrar of the Friendly Societies, with 
agreement of the Treasury, to outline the requirements to designate individual 
societies suitable for investment by trustees and receive government loans (S.I. 1959 
No. 1010). As part of the Designation for Trustee Investment Regulation and while 
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looking to manage the rate of asset growth at building societies, the Exchequer20, 
through the Chief Registrar, decided that three major conditions had to be met:  
a) total assets should be at least £500,000;  
b) a minimum net reserve level of 2.5 per cent (effective at the end from 
December 1960); and  
c) a minimum liquidity requirement of 7.5 per cent (effective at the end of 
December 1960).  
Societies were also required to make formal application by writing to the Chief 
Registrar and accompany this letter with a copy of the latest published accounts, a 
copy of the current prospectus or brochures soliciting deposits or investment and 
additional information in the form of a questionnaire (Registry of Friendly Societies, 
1960: 7). Through this information the Chief Regis trar aimed to determine, firstly, 
that the society’s financial statements met the requirements set in the statutory 
requirement. Secondly, ‘that the apparent liquidity and reserves disclosed in the 
financial statements existed in reality’ (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1960: 8). With 
that purpose in mind, each society was to disclose full particulars of each investment 
shown in the balance sheet, how much had been advanced on mortgages during the 
month prior to the drafting of the financial statements (as some societies restricted 
advances for that month to enhance their liquidity) and amounts shown under ‘other 
liabilities’ (such as tax, investments and contingent liabilities).  With regard to their 
reserve position, societies were asked to disclose any changes in the way accounts had 
been drawn up while responding to the disclosure requirements introduced in 1959 as 
well as their provisions for future tax liabilities. 
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For the building societies, designation meant more than an increase in loanable 
resources.21 Building societies first sought to secure trustee status for investments in 
their ‘shares’ and deposits in the mid-1920s (Humphries, 1987: 335). In 1959, 
securing trustee status was seen as giving ‘competitive advantage.’22 But it rapidly 
turned into ‘a seal of respectability for building societies and all but a very few 
societies eligible for have sought and obtained such status.’ (Boléat, 1981: 32). 
Indeed, by December 1961 there were 255 designated societies, whose sum of total 
assets was estimated at £3,274,000,000, equivalent to 95.3 per cent of the assets of all 
registered societies (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1962: 5).  
Securing trustee status became synonymous with minimum requirements to 
compete in the building society industry when the BSA adopted the same guidelines 
for reserve and liquidity requirements as a condition for membership in 1959. The 
BSA was more generous in the time to meet the reserve and liquidity requirements 
(granting until 1965) to allow smaller and less liquid societies to catch up. The move 
by the BSA recognised the need for stricter financial requirements of its members 
(Boléat, 1981: 15), thereby ‘giving the public the same guarantee of security in the 
case of deposits and investments in smaller societies, [as] trustee status gave to the 
larger societies.’ (Cleary, 1965: 268).   
The need for a liquidity requirement was highlighted by the difficulties 
experienced at, and eventual collapses of, the Exeter Benefit Society in 1956 and the 
relatively large Scottish Amicable Society in 1958. In practice, however, for the 
movement as a whole, cash and investments had not been less than 14 per cent per 
annum since 1945 (Cleary, 1965: 256) and were to remain above 15 per cent until at 
least 1973 (Greer, 1974: 11). This as the ‘normal’ range for liquidity ratios for 
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individual societies was between 12 and 22 per cent for any one year (Perks, 1977: 
62).  
While meeting the liquidity requirement was not much of a problem for most 
building societies, meeting the reserve requirement was more of a challenge. Sir Cecil 
Crabbe, Chief Registrar, warned that in 1959 large and small societies increased their 
general reserves by abandoning the practice of making provisions for future liabilities 
(Registry of Friendly Societies, 1960: 8). He also took note of societies who had 
revalued their office premises and that increase taken to general reserves. However, 
the apparent appreciation was disregarded as part of the assessment for designation, 
unless the society intended to realise the operation in fixed assets in the foreseeable 
future (idem).  
Of the 744 societies in January 1959, 338 were members of the BSA and 263 had 
assets over £500,000. Of these 240 complied with the new regulation in all respects. 
In June 1959, 130 societies immediately qualified for trustee status (including the top 
five societies). About a dozen applications were pending and a few had been turned 
down. 23 By December 1959, 190 societies had been designated.24 The number of 
designations grew to 215 by December 1960 (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1961: 6). 
Evidently, not all societies that could have (or actually) applied for trustee status 
satisfied the requirement. The Chief Registrar was said to have been careful and 
examined in detail that ‘… any apparent liquidity existed in reality and similarly 
[examined] the reserve position, particularly where a society’s accounts [had] shown 
any sudden increase…’ (idem, p. 6). The Chief Registrar explained that most of the 
pending applications (seven in all) related to the loss in market value of the reserve 
instruments (idem, p. 7). He also stated that some societies had been warned about the 
continuation of their trustee status but gave no details as to their number. Neither did 
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he disclose the identity of the societies which had been warned or which applications 
were pending. 
Effects of the minimum reserve requirements on the top five building societies 
Just as capital adequacy helps booster confidence on banks, building societies need 
reserves to provide against four contingencies: a) a loss on the sale of a mortgage 
property following the default of a borrower; b) a loss on the realisation of an 
investment in securities (mainly trading in fixed income secur ities); c) to guard 
against the unknown and d) to give confidence to investors.25 Prior to the House 
Purchase Act 1959, the BSA had long recommended that every society should aim at 
possessing a ‘gross’ (i.e. a less strictly defined level of) reserves of at least 5 per cent 
of total assets. In 1938 the average figure for all societies was 5.5 per cent but, 
consistent with their considerable growth, by 1957 the average reserve for all societies 
had fallen to 4.5 per cent.26  
The ‘decline in the [gross] reserve ratio was not in itself regarded as serious’27 
by the BSA. However, some building societies, as the Bristol and West, had 
traditionally placed a high premium ‘on the maintenance of healthy reserve and 
liquidity ratios, and there was never any question that growth would be allowed to 
diminish either’ (Harvey, 1988: 258). Meeting statutory requirements was thus easily 
achieved for some societies. However, that was not the case for all societies looking 
to qualify as eligible for trustee investments and particularly larger societies which, as 
mentioned before, had been growing at twice the average rate for the sector. See 
Table 3 for a comparison. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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Table 3 shows own estimates of the ‘gross’ reserve ratio averaging 3.8 per 
annum and the net reserve ratio averaging 3.5 per cent per annum for the top five 
societies between 1959 and 1967.  However, two values stand out as particularly 
weak namely the net reserve ratio for the Alliance (2.5 per cent in 1959 and 2.9 per 
cent in 1960) and the CPBS (2.3 per cent in 1959 and 2.7 per cent in 1960). This is 
not surprising when considering that asset growth in Panel C of Table 2 shows the 
societies with the highest rates of growth, between 1950 and 1958, were the Co-
operative Permanent (166 per cent) and Alliance (128 per cent). These two and the 
smaller Leek and Moorland, had figured prominently amongst all societies because of 
their high rates of asset growth since 1945 (Cleary, 1965: 252). This growth reflected 
their success in making mortgage advances as well as active involvement in a number 
of amalgamations with and transfer of engagements from, other societies.  There was 
no public record to suggest that the Alliance had any difficulties in meeting the 
reserve requirements, to gain and maintain trustee status.28 That was not the case of 
the CPBS. 
The Co-operative Permanent Building Society 
Brief business history, 1884-1958 
The CPBS (today Nationwide) was born as the Southern Co-operative Permanent 
Building Society in February 1884. The ‘Southern’ prefix was removed ten years 
afterwards. The purpose of this London-based society was to enable depositors and 
particularly those who were participants in the co-operative movement to buy their 
own premises (Ashworth, 1980: 15; Cassell, 1984: 13). The Co-operative Congress, 
however, refused to give full backing to another financial institution developing 
alongside the banking arm of the Co-operative Wholesale Society or CWS Bank (see 
further Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). So the CPBS sought business elsewhere, notably amongst 
 22 
railway employees (Cassell, 1984: 24-5). But in spite of the Co-operative Congress’ 
snub, many leading and rank and file members of the Co-operative Movement joined 
the CPBS and some even decided to become its agents (either personally or through 
their retail societies).  
 The CPBS developed a well established personal business from its London office, 
while its agency network grew throughout England. By 1896 agencies were in place 
as far field as Durham, Cambridge and Kent. By developing personal business the 
CPBS avoided being involved in the misfortunes of those building societies that were 
closely associated with financing industrial properties. By 1929, the CPBS had 
become the eighth largest building society in Britain, with total assets of £9.5 million 
(Ashworth, 1980: 81). Mortgage advances continued to fuel growth in total assets as 
rent controls on private dwellings restricted the supply of rental properties and, thus, 
encouraged owner occupancies.  
 Growth in total assets was mirrored in an increasing network of agencies and 
retail branches. Figure 1 illustrates the number of CPBS’s branches and agencies – the 
latter extensively sought throughout the co-operative movement.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 shows that between 1925 and 1935 the Society’s retail branches grew 
to 19 branches. Between 1936 and 1945 the number of retail branches grew at an 
annual average rate of 30 per cent to 46 branches, surpassing the three per cent 
average annual growth in agencies (estimated to be 577 in 1945). Between 1946 and 
1955 agencies grew faster (at an average annual rate of 14 per cent to 2,016 agencies) 
than branches, which had average eight per cent annual growth to 93 branches. At its 
peak in 1958, agencies numbered 3,165 but not all of these were an effective source 
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of mortgage referrals (see further Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). Retail branches in England and 
from 1930 in Scotland, emerged from a combination of own investments and from the 
amalgamation with small-sized societies.29 As a result of acquisitions and internal 
geographic expansion, the CPBS increased its scale and reduced the volatility of its 
business portfolio.  
Response to Housing and House Purchase Act 1959  
Growth in mortgage assets at the CPBS during the 1950s had been above the average 
for the top five societies (Cassell, 1984: 72), reaching 24 per cent between 1957 and 
1958. The high level of asset growth in 1957-8 for the CPBS followed the 
amalgamation with the Scottish Amicable Building Society, with assets of 
£22,500,000,000 (14 per cent of total assets of the new entity) and 42,658 
‘shareholders’ (11 per cent of the new entity). When interest rates for gilt-edged 
securities reached 7 per cent in September 1957, the Scottish Amicable reserves of 
£997,792 for fiscal year 1957, were insufficient to cover a (nominal) loss of 
£1,500,000.30 Publication of these figures by the leading society north of Hadrian’s 
Wall was followed by withdrawal notices, which by April 23 amounted to 
£2,500,000. Most withdrawals were cancelled once the merger was announced.31 The 
Scottish directors retired from office without compensation but, with the transfer of 
CPBS’s business in Scotland, became the CPBS’s Scottish board. 
 Later on, the impact of the Scottish amalgamation on CPBS’s reserves resulted in 
Mr. H. V. Wiles, chairman of the Hastings and Thanet society, publicly questioning 
whether the CPBS, then the third largest society in terms of assets, would achieve 
trustee status.32 This came in the context of CPBS’s contested bid for the Sheerness 
and Gillingham. For Mr. W. W. Wetherhill, general manager of the Hastings, the 
intervention of the CPBS was ‘unsolicited and unwarranted’ (as well as the first time 
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any amalgamation between building societies had been contested).33 Mr Herbert 
Ashworth, general manager of the CPBS, said the intervention ‘was justified by the 
strong reserve position and the well spread assets of the Sheerness society.’34 After 
the Leek and Moreland also made an offer for the Sheerness, the Hastings had no 
choice but to raise its offer even further and eventually win control over the 
Sheerness’ £3,000,000 in total assets and 8,000 members. 35  
 The CPBS publicly retorted to Mr Wiles’s criticism saying that it ‘would qualify 
for trustee status within the set time.’36 The CPBS’s assets were amongst the first to 
be designated suitable for trustee status in June 1959.  But the CPBS reserves 
remained lower than other larger societies. Indeed, directors of the CPBS eventually 
realised that, in spite of a period of controlled growth introduced in January 1959, 
fulfilling the reserve requirement was at peril and decided to take pre-emptive action, 
which included changing the depreciation policy: 
‘It was noted that the [Finance] Committee had considered the effect on the 
net reserve ratio of each of the various steps agreed by the Board on 27th 
October 1960. In particular the [Finance] Committee had considered the 
possibility of recommending the Board to reserve its decision with regard to 
the provision of depreciation on freehold premises but they had been 
impressed by the argument that if the whole of the £53,145 required by the 
depreciation formula were provided, it would no longer be possible for the 
society to give an assurance that a net reserve ratio of 2.5 per cent would have 
been attained whether or not New Oxford House had been sold or, 
alternatively, whether or not the basis of provision for income tax had been 
changed. They had therefore reached the conclusion that is was desirable for 
all adjustments already agreed by the Board to be made so that the accounts 
would indicate a net reserve ratio of 2.677 per cent. 
The Board were advised, however, that since the Committee had considered 
the accounts, the Auditors had decided that it would be necessary for a note to 
appear on the Revenue and Appropriation Account if no depreciation were 
provided on freehold premises in 1960. The Board was informed that, if an 
amount of up to £13,000 were provided on freehold premises, the note would 
not be needed, and it would still be possible to give the assurance mentioned 
above.’ 
  (CPBS, Minutes of the Board, 4.I.a, 19-Jan-1961)  
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The Minutes of the Board and of the Finance Committee did not detailed depreciation 
formulae nor did they included supporting calculations to explain the difference 
between the £53,145 required by the depreciation formula and £13,000 suggested by 
the auditors. The minutes did point out that, after discussion, it was formally moved 
that £13,000 be charged for depreciation of freehold premises. The auditors were Mr. 
J. Heaford FCA, senior auditor, and Mr J.A. McGilchrist CA, junior auditor (both 
from Edward Myers, Clark & Co). They confirmed that it would be unnecessary to 
include a note in the accounts regarding depreciation, and that, in their opinion, ‘the 
accounts were properly drawn up in accordance with the relevant legislation and 
presented a true and fair view.’37  
 The CPBS then extended the period of controlled growth and halted its 
expansionary policy. The introduction of a controlled rate of growth had been 
publicly announced shortly after the failed bid for the Sheerness and Gillingham 
society in January 1959 and was expected to last but a couple of years.38 However, the 
need to maintain trustee status required that policy to remain in place longer than 
anticipated. It is worth noting that there was no provision for automatic revocation 
when a society ceased to fulfil the requirements or regulations. Qualification or 
revocation were ultimately at the discretion of the Chief Registrar (Registry of 
Friendly Societies, 1961: 7). 
 As a result of controlled growth the CPBS expanded considerably less than other 
larger societies. Panel B in Table 2 shows that total mortgage assets at the CPBS grew 
158 per cent between 1958 and 1967 when the average for the top five societies was 
208 per cent for the same period. The period of controlled growth required,  
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1) imposing a £500 ceiling on new advances (at a time when the average 
mortgage loan in the UK was £1,112. See Registry of Friendly Societies, 
1961: 2);   
2) stopping the outflow of funds by ceasing the contracts of more than 1,000 
agents (which more liquid competitors were eager to capture); 
3) arranging a deal with the Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS) so that in 1961 
(back dated to fiscal year 1959-60), the CPBS sold and leased back its head 
office (New Oxford House) and eight branch premises, all of which ‘stood in 
the books below their present worth.’39 The freehold properties passed to the 
CIS for £500,000 and the CPBS took out a 99 year lease, with the option to 
repurchase at no more than 10 per cent higher than the sale price.40 The 
freehold for head office was, indeed, bought back a short while later (Cassell, 
1984: 80).  
Table 4 and 5 respectively show the CPBS’s Balance Sheet and Revenue and 
Appropriation Account for the fiscal years 1959 and 1960. 
[Insert Table 4  & 5 around here] 
The Balance Sheet in Table 4 recorded the sale and lease back operation 
through a drop of £479,529 in Offices Premises and Equipment. The Revenue and 
Appropriation Account in Table 5 reported a drop of £71,288 in the charge for 
Depreciation, mirroring the Board’s decision on freehold buildings. A ‘Surplus on the 
sale of premises’ of £424,484 recorded the sale and lease back operation as an 
occasional item. 
 The drastic package of measures described above was sufficient to avert an 
immediate crisis at the CPBS, including avoiding the need to request dispensation for 
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the designation as suitable to receive trustee investments. Indeed, Panel B in Table 3 
shows the reserve ratio of the CPBS at 2.9 per cent for 1959, well above the minimum 
required to meet the Chief Registrar’s criteria and also above the ratio recorded in 
1958 – the lowest point for the reserve ratio between 1950 and 1967. Panel A in Table 
3 also shows an end to the downward trend in the reserve ratio for all other larger 
societies - average reserve ratio for the top five societies had dropped from 5.0 per 
cent in 1950 to 3.8 per cent in 1959.  After reserve requirements were introduced the 
average net reserve ratio for the top five societies remained above 3 per cent for each 
of the societies (see Panel B in Table 3).  
 Table 5 shows a decrease of 13 per cent in Premises, Offices and Equipment for 
the CPBS in 1960; and except for an eight per cent increase in 1966, there was 
moderate growth thereafter (i.e. an average annual growth of 15 per between 1961 
and 1967, compared to an average of 26 per cent between 1955 and 1959). But Table 
6 shows that other societies, notably the Alliance and the Woolwich Equitable, also 
had to make adjustments in the rhythm of the ir expansion.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 The self- imposed period of restraint for the CPBS ended in 1963, when annual 
growth of mortgage assets returned to double-digit rates (see Table 2) and the net 
reserve ratio rose to remain above 3.5 per cent (see Panel B in Table 3). For the CPBS 
the period of self- restraint to meet capital requirements resulted in a major review of 
strategy. It found that half of the 1,159 agencies in existence in 1963 produced 
deposits amounting to less than £2,000. The response was to replace those agents with 
CPBS employees and move to a branch structure whenever possible (Cassell, 1984: 
82-3).  
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 The move to replace agents, however, was not unique to the CPBS. Since 1948 
there was growing realisation amongst directors of building societies that retail 
society branches ‘promised control, co-ordination and continuity in a way that 
commission agents, however special, could not’ (Harvey, 1988: 257). As a result, 
national retail society branch networks mushroomed during the 1960s and 1970s (see 
Davies, 1981).  
 The continued growth of the movement after 1959 further reduced the reserves of 
many societies. By 1963 some societies were near the point of having to make a 
choice between continued growth and losing their trustee status or maintaining trustee 
status and slowing their growth (Cleary, 1965: 258). As a response, in 1964 the 
reserve ratio requirement was further loosened by the Chief Registrar, such that only 
the first £100,000,000 of assets required reserves of 2.5 per cent, with remaining 
assets requiring reserves of only 2 per cent. In 1967 a committee chaired by Sir 
Charles Hardie recommended lower reserve ratios for larger societies, a suggestion 
which would have saved the CPBS much heartache if it had been implemented earlier 
(Cassell, 1984: 81). A new reserve requirements took effect in 1968 and remained 
unchanged until the mid-1980s (see further Boléat, 1986: 57-8).  
Discussion 
The relative importance of trustee status 
The CPBS’s Finance Committee raised the possibility of changing the depreciation 
policy (and the more drastic adjustment of the sale  and lease back of the head office 
and eight retail branches) because there was no other item (material or not) which 
would allow for adjustments in the accounts. 
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Evidence also suggested that the CPBS’s directors feared an over-reaction 
should their financ ial statements be qualified or the society have lost its trustee status. 
Stakeholders using the financial statements of the CPBS included regulators (such as 
the Exchequer, the Chief Registrar of the Friendly Societies and the BSA), close 
competitors, and several thousand (financially obtuse) members and depositors. Sir 
Cecil Crabbe, the Chief Registrar, raised the stakes in his annual report for the year 
ended in December 1960 as he cautioned investors to guard against societies ‘which 
are of doubtful financial standing, and reminded would be investors …. to enquire 
whether [a society] has been designated as one in which trustees may deposit trust 
funds.’41 With this move, the Chief Registrar raised awareness amongst depositors 
and the general public of the good business and sound financial standing of 
designated societies. 
It is worth noting here that Mr C. John Dunham, President of the CPBS since 
1959 and a member of the BSA council since 1950, was appointed Chairman of the 
BSA in 1961.42 Close links between the BSA council and directors of the CPBS dated 
to the appointment of Arthur Webb, then Secretary of the CPBS, to the BSA 
executive in 1903. Mr Webb joined the CPBS in 1892 (when total assets were 
£25,000), became Managing Director in 1928 (when total assets were £7,000,000), 
Chairman in 1939 (when total assets were £30,000,000) and retired from the BSA 
executive in 1946 and the CPBS Board in 1951 (when total assets were £66,000,000). 
Mr Webb ‘constantly urged the desirability of societies maintaining a 10 per cent 
reserve fund, and whenever he spoke his views merited attention.’ (Price, 1959: 381). 
The appointment of Mr Dunham and the public position of Mr Webb thus suggested 
that CPBS directors had closely associated themselves with the virtues of an 
‘adequate’ level of reserves. 
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The above suggest that directors of the third biggest society could simply not 
afford to lose the designation because trustee status was perceived as a hallmark of 
prestige as well as giving potential for competitive advantage. Moreover, members of 
the Board had openly campaigned for societies to maintain a high reserve ratio. 
Qualifying the accounts (even a comment or note on the financial statements) would 
not only foreclose growth opportunities associated with maintaining trustee status but 
would also be regarded as a serious action by the CPBS's auditors and a strong 
negative signal on the quality of the management capabilities of the Board of 
Directors.  
Minimum charge 
There is evidence that in making a minimum charge the directors of the CPBS were 
acting upon the advice of the auditors, which the directors considered proper and 
authoritative. The Board Minutes of January 19th 1961 suggested that auditors had 
discussed fully the question of depreciation and thus the basis upon which the 
directors had founded their estimates and provisions. Auditors and directors could 
then claim that the working lives of the buildings had been honestly estimated and 
that the (minimum) rate written off appeared to be sufficient to reduce the value of 
buildings to nil by the end of such period. Therefore, they had a right to say that 
‘…correct principles had been acted upon, and that the provision made in the accounts 
appears to be reasonable and sufficient.’ (de Paula, 1957: 99). 
It is possible that in making a minimum charge the directors of the CPBS were 
perhaps excessively prudent with regards to the provision for depreciation. Faced with 
the impossibility of estimating the working life of fixed assets that are actively 
maintained and in contravention of Recommendations IX and VX by the ICAEW, 
clearing banks (with their much larger retail bank branch network in high street 
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locations) chose not to depreciate freehold property at all (Capie and Billings, 2001: 
238). Perks (1977: 177-81) claims the situation was similar at other building societies 
(at least in the early 1970s). Not depreciating freehold properties by CPBS could have 
thus been considered ‘best practice’ (as described by de Paula, 1957: 98 and 145). 
Moreover, in making a minimum charge, directors and auditors could argue that the 
depreciation policy was still being adhered to as some depreciation was charged, 
albeit a lower amount than usual. 
The CPBS’s balance sheet for fiscal years 1959 and 1960 show building 
societies reported fixed assets at cost less depreciation  (see Table 4). As late as 1977, 
there was no requirement to show original cost or aggregate depreciation (Perks, 
1977: 37). In that sense the CPBS’s accounts remained technically correct in spite of a 
change in the depreciation policy. It could thus be argued that the CPBS was adhering 
to its overall depreciation policy by looking at the life of the asset as a whole and that 
this was well within established practice at the time within retail financial 
intermediaries. This approach, however, would reflect how accountants have great 
difficulty in accepting that salvage value might be higher than original cost other than 
for land which historically has never been subject to a systematic depreciation charge 
in the UK (Burlaud et al., 1996: 302). 
An immaterial amount 
Directors of the CPBS could have further defended their decision when considering 
that the amount being adjusted was negligible in the overall context of the annual 
financial statements. That is, when considering liabilities of £6,418,160 and ‘Office 
Premises and Equipment’ of £3,683,959 in 1959 then £53,145 required by the 
depreciation formula is immaterial. Moreover, the ICAEW stated that there was no 
need to disclose when changes were immaterial: 
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‘Where there has been a change (whether of [the actual] rate or by reason of 
valuation) in the basis of depreciation during the period covered by the report, 
the effect of the change should be indicated in the report if the effect is 
material and cannot be dealt with appropriately in the adjustments made in 
arriving at the figures shown in the report.’ Recommendation XIII (2). 
 It could also be argued that, in 1959-60, at the time of the decision by CPBS 
directors, failure to meet minimum reserve requirements was not a long-term 
problem. If the problem was only a 'blip' in profits then it might be right to go ahead 
and not qualify. With hindsight, it took about three to four years for the CPBS to 
renew overall growth, which could be considered short to medium term in the context 
of the post-war recovery years.43 However, directors faced the possibility that there 
were indeed serious difficulties with reserves and thus, a major adjustment was just 
being deferred. Moreover, the fact that the net reserve ratio was technically (on the 
depreciation formula) below the required minimum signalled reduced growth in the 
future (as capital reserves had to built up). This was corroborated by a lower 
performance in the annual rate of asset growth at the CPBS than at other top societies 
between 1961 and 1964. But to the credit of CPBS’s directors, the policy of controlled 
growth had been publicly announced some 18 months before the decision to change 
the depreciation policy was made.  
Auditors’ remuneration and management expense 
At the time of the decision by CPBS’s directors, the requirements of the Companies 
Act 1948 were barely ten years old and were even less prescriptive than today.  There 
was minimal guidance on disclosure in the Companies Acts 1948 and many 
accounting decisions were at the discretion of company directors and auditors. In this 
context, the decision by CPBS’s directors and the support of their auditors could be 
considered appropriate on the grounds of their reputation: ‘societies were audited by 
local accountants with whom they had connections and a relationship of trust.’44 
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Annual returns (Form A.R. 11) show that Mr. McGilchrist took office as junior 
auditor in 1956 and Mr. Heaford as senior auditor in 1957. Mr. Heaford joined only 
after Mr J. B. Prentice FCA ‘…was compelled to resign the office of members’ 
auditor which he had held for the past 17 years because of ill health.’45 As late as 
1970 both Mr Heaford and Mr McGilchrist remained as the Society’s auditors .46   
By appointing local auditors for lengthy periods of time, the CBPS was 
following standard practice amongst building societies at the time. The result was that 
by 1960, the auditors had known the Society for some years and were well aware of 
the integr ity of the Board.  Auditors could trust the Board to take appropriate action.  
There was no need to tell members or regulators since, at the time the decision of not 
qualifying the annual report was made, failure to comply with minimum net reserve 
requirements was perceived as a short-term problem which would not reoccur. 
Directors of the CPBS could have explained a qualification in light of the 
expense increase likely to emerge each and every year thereafter as it might have been 
very costly to hire surveyors to value a growing number of buildings separately. There 
is systematic empirical evidence to suggest that companies with a qualified audit 
report have a greater number of buildings than those of the comparator group, but also 
they may be organisationally more dispersed, and consequently more costly to 
estimate their value (Craswell, 1986: 34). Even before the amalgamation with the 
Scottish Amicable, the CPBS had retail branches spread throughout the UK. 
Inspecting them each and every year in time for the annual report could have 
substantially increased the aud it fee. Putting forward an argument for keeping 
management expenses under control could have been quite reasonable in the context 
of a growing retail building society branch network and/or the amalgamation of retail 
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branches of the Scottish Amicable. In this way, directors of the CPBS would have 
reduced the seriousness of the qualification. 
However, there was no indication that additional investigation and testing 
would have increased the length of the discussions between auditors and directors and 
indeed, related expenses (such as the audit fee). Auditor remunerations were a very 
small proportion of the total management expenses. The exact figure for the CPBS 
was difficult to ascertain because the Revenue and Appropriation Account for 1960 
consolidated ‘Auditors’ Remuneration’ into the larger ‘Remuneration and Travelling 
Expenses’. However, Perks (1977: 111-2) estimated that audit fees paid in 1975 
ranged between £15,500 to £46,000, that is, auditing a society with total assets of 
£601,000,000 was proportionately three times as expensive as auditing a society with 
total assets of £4,577,000,000. Applying the ratio reported by Perks (1977) for larger 
societies to the CPBS in 1960, the audit fee would have been £2,405 or 0.2 per cent of 
the ‘Total Management Expenses’ of £1,339,965 for that year.  
No evidence was found suggesting the auditors received (or not) other types of 
business from the CPBS. This was important because at the end of the 1960s large 
auditing firms were instrumental in the selection of computer equipment for several 
societies including the Leeks and Moreland, CPBS and Woolwich Equitable (Bátiz-
Lazo and Wardley, 2007). In summary, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
auditors were exposed to conflicts of interests. 
Need for transparency 
There were issues of transparency as any change in accounting policy should be 
flagged up to stakeholders – as the change will be difficult to spot otherwise, since 
total assets and depreciation figures included other fixed assets (e.g. the growing retail 
 35 
society network) and the depreciation figure for each individual asset is thus 
impossible to estimate.  
To illustrate the impact of the lack of transparency, an attempt was made to 
recreate the depreciation charge associated with ‘Office and Premises’ by the CPBS in 
fiscal year 1960. According to Cassell (1984: 43), in 1925 freehold land was 
purchased for £55,000 in central London (High Holborn) with the purpose of erecting 
a new head office. Construction took four years and its total cost was undisclosed.  
According to the Board minutes of January 19th 1961, the market value of the 
eight branches and head office was above their book value. There was thus permanent 
impairment for the buildings. However, while there was little prospect of the value of 
the building and premises returning to its original value, that might not necessarily be 
the case for the land (i.e. the freehold property might have only been temporarily 
impaired). 
For argument’s sake, the cost of erecting the building was assumed to be equal 
to the cost of the freehold land. Also in 1925 the CPBS recorded having two retail 
branches, located in Birmingham and Letchworth (then in the outskirts of London). At 
the time, ‘an individual loan [to purchase a home] would be for about £400 or less and 
99-year leases would be normal’ (Cassell, 1984: 39). Taking this data as reference, it 
was assumed that freehold property in the high street suitable for a retail branch 
would cost £500. Its working life was assumed to be 70 years as this was the ratio of 
‘Office Premises and Equipment’ in the CPBS’s balance sheet in fiscal year 1959 
(£3,683,959) to depreciation expense quoted in the Board Minutes (£53,145). The 
expansion of the CPBS’s retail branch network was assumed to have been solely by 
acquisition of premises while the issuing of agent contracts was costless. Additions or 
disposals of the branch network were valued at the original notional cost of  £500 in 
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1925 compounded at the rate suggested by Scott’s (1996: 267) initial yield on 
investment on office property (1925-1960).  
Given the lack of detailed financial statements, the growth rate of the balance 
in the depreciable assets account was assumed to be uniform over the estimated 
average age of those assets. This assumption meant that the growth rate in the most 
recent year should be the same as that assumed to occur uniformly over the life of 
depreciable assets. As a result of these calculations, the estimated value for head 
office and retail branches in 1959 was £369,587 with an estimated depreciation 
expense for that year (using the straight line method) of £5,279. Clearly these values 
were far below those stated in the 1959 balance sheet (£3,683,959) and pre-audit 
depreciation expense in the Board Minutes (£53,145).  
This initial yield on investment on office property, 70 year’s useful life, LIFO 
in the depreciable assets account and straight line method; the charges in 1960 valued, 
in prices of 1925, head office at £2,544,305 (46 times the cost of the freehold land in 
1925 or 4.6 times the value of the ‘sale and lease back’ in 1960) and the retail 
branches at an average of £8,038 per branch. Presumably the CPBS was capitalising 
for more than the cost of buildings and freehold land in their balance sheet. This helps 
to explain why the CPBS had the highest absolute nominal value of ‘Office 
Equipment and Premises’ amongst the top five building societies (which averaged 
£3,438,846 between 1950 and 1967 for the CPBS as opposed to £1,269,050 for the 
Woolwich). Own estimates suggested that the ratio of ‘Office Premises and 
Equipment’ to total assets averaged 1.40 per cent per annum between 1950 and 1967 
for the CPBS  – values which were well above those observed for the Halifax (0.27 
per cent per annum) and the average for the top five societies (1.06 per cent) but 
below those of the Alliance (2.32 per cent per annum). Of course, other societies 
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could have rented a higher proportion of their retail branch premises than the CPBS or 
depreciated at a higher rate. Which effect dominated is uncertain given disclosure 
practices described above.      
Other differences between own estimates and those reported in the balance 
sheet were also evident. Specifically, between 1959 and 1960 ‘Office Premises and 
Equipment’ of the CPBS dropped £479,529 – a figure below the value of the ‘sale and 
lease back’ transaction discussed in the Minutes and above the sum of ‘Surplus on the 
Sale of premises’ (£424,484) and ‘Proceeds on the sale of leases’ (£16,842) reported 
in the Revenue and Appropriation Account. Differences between own estimates and 
those reported in the balance sheet highlight the need for transparency in the reporting 
practices of the CPBS (or any other large building society for that matter) and the 
compelling need to qualify the audit report due to the change in depreciation policy.  
Indeed, transparency would have helped to show whether there had been a 
change in the life of freehold premises. This change could have resulted from the 
completion of a purpose built 11-storey extension to head office (New Oxford 
House)47 or, alternatively, from consolidating assets following the amalgamation of 
the Scottish Amicable. A change in the life of freehold premises would have made the 
accounts technically accurate. 
Conclusion  
Napier (1990) notes that ‘although accounting historians have long recognized the 
significance of fixed asset accounting for the development of financial reporting, 
much of the existing literature is very general, based on secondary sources such as 
professional accountancy journals and legal cases.’ (p. 23). Research in this article 
explores issues around the depreciation of fixed assets in the other wise neglected 
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context of financial service organizations by combining secondary sources with 
original archival material. The analysis of managerial discretion in a mutual 
organization replaced the more traditional approach based on market efficiency.  The 
research is also innovative thanks to its attention to the otherwise neglected study of 
building societies.  Academic research into building societies seems to have dwindled 
(both from an historical and management studies perspectives) after most of the larger 
societies converted into limited companies during the 1990s.   
Systematic exploration of qualification decisions is rare. Data on depreciation 
decisions leading to qualified accounts is difficult to obtain. Even when available, it is 
commonly hypothesised that depreciation charges can have a smoothing effect on 
reported earnings, bias performance in the stock market and that it will be 
shareholders and main creditors who will be adversely affected by qualification. 
Research in this article abandons the traditional link between mooting effects and 
stock market efficiency. This article takes an historical perspective to evaluate the link 
between depreciation of buildings, audit qualification and firm failure in the rather 
different context of a mutual service firm, where accounting for fixed assets is a 
minor consideration. The case of asset management at the CPBS in the context of 
changed regulation brings out problems regarding how to deal with deprecia tion, land 
and buildings, materiality and more generally who is the audience for financial 
statements and to whom auditors are accountable.  
 The CPBS decision appears to be a rare or even unique occasion where the 
depreciation of fixed assets ultimately had a material effect on the performance of a 
financial intermediary. The context around the decision offers evidence in support the 
so called ‘bond covenant hypothesis’ (Clinch, 1983: 141). This view suggests that 
covenants will affect management choice of accounting methods since the managers 
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will wish to avoid the costs of violating restrictions. These costs are concerned with 
the renegotiation of the debt contract, possible bankruptcy which may (or may not) 
follow a technical default, or in the CPBS’s case, the possibility of maintaining trustee 
status. A review of available archival evidence suggests that the action of the CPBS 
was not representative amongst the top five building societies.48  
The case of the CPBS highlighted how interpreting problems in a service 
company is more difficult than for a manufacturing company.  If a manufacturing or 
mining firm faced a similar situation to that of the CPBS, management’s 
shortcomings would be evident as either stocks would grow, plant would remain idle 
or the audit fee would increase substantially. In a service firm stakeholders have to 
rely more on the financial accounts and hence, consistency is important. Changes in 
provisions or in dividend policies are some of the ways available to financial 
intermediaries to signal that there might be problems ahead. Indeed, an appropriate 
clarification could have helped the directors of the CPBS to fully articulate the 
implications of the end of a period of high growth and the start of one of 
retrenchment. 
Evidence documented in this article suggests that during the 1950s and 1960s, 
directors of building societies (and perhaps even banks) had little regard for financial 
considerations when making capital expenditures. This would indicate that future 
studies on the capital- intensive investments in UK retail finance (such as large 
computers and an expanding retail branch network made during the late 1960s and 
1970s) to explore whether strategic rather than financial considerations were the chief 
influence on the selection and timing of those investments. 
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Table 1: Distinctive Actions of Government Housing Policy, 1951-1959 
 
Year Action 
1951 Tory government takes office while promoting the creation of ‘a 
nation-wide property owning democracy.’49 This goal included 
making owner-occupation a possibility for a whole group of average 
and below average workers. But building societies were reluctant to 
take higher risk borrowers. 
1953 Negotiations between government and building societies start. 
1954 Agreement is reached. Two schemes were set up to aid prospective 
owner-occupants: (a) for houses valued at up to £2,500 advances of 
up to 90 per cent could be made by societies, and (b) for houses built 
after 1918 valued below £2,000 advances up to 95 per cent could be 
made.  
1958 The Government proposed to make a new fund amounting to 
£100,000,000 and repayable over twenty years. The government 
expected to release some £40,000,000 to £50,000,000 of building 
society money being lent on pre-1919 houses for loans for newer 
houses.  
 
1959 Agreement is reached. Passing of Housing and House Purchase Act 
1959. Funds start to be distributed.  
 




Source: Boddy (1980: 17-19), Boleat (1981: 153), Clearly (1965), The Times (06-
Nov-1958: p. 16) and author. 
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Table 2: Asset Growth at the Top Five Building Societies, 1951-1967 
Year  Abbey  Alliance Co-operative Leeds Woolwich Halifax Average 
   National    Permanent Permanent Equitable     
        
Panel A - Asset growth per annum50 
        
1951 13.2% 10.4% 3.8% 13.2% 14.7% 10.1% 10.9% 
1952 12.8% 14.6% 7.8% 9.6% 8.8% 13.1% 11.1% 
1953 17.2% 15.2% 19.2% 11.9% 12.6% 11.5% 14.6% 
1954 15.5% 18.1% 20.6% 13.4% 17.6% 15.2% 16.7% 
1955 9.9% 15.0% 21.9% 12.3% 15.2% 10.8% 14.2% 
1956 10.5% 11.7% 11.9% 8.1% 7.9% 9.0% 9.8% 
1957 7.6% 12.3% 13.2% 7.7% 5.4% 15.7% 10.3% 
1958 7.8% 6.8% 23.7% 14.0% 6.8% 12.6% 11.9% 
1959 13.3% 10.7% 7.7% 0.0% 12.6% 12.9% 9.5% 
1960 12.8% 5.0% 7.2% 8.5% 13.9% 16.0% 10.6% 
1961 10.0% 6.4% 8.7% 7.0% 14.1% 9.1% 9.2% 
1962 11.5% 14.7% 9.2% 9.2% 8.6% 13.2% 11.1% 
1963 15.2% 24.0% 13.1% 14.1% 10.9% 16.4% 15.6% 
1964 16.6% 18.2% 13.5% 20.8% 15.7% 13.0% 16.3% 
1965 11.0% 15.0% 9.8% 13.4% 11.5% 12.7% 12.2% 
1966 15.8% 23.3% 14.9% 20.0% 15.0% 15.6% 17.4% 
1967 18.4% 23.2% 16.1% 20.0% 10.9% 19.6% 18.0% 
        
Average 12.7% 14.5% 12.5% 12.2% 11.4% 14.2% 12.9% 
        
Panel B - Asset growth period to 1967 
        
To/from        
1956-1967 272% 336% 261% 250% 227% 331% 280% 
1958-1967 221% 263% 158% 185% 190% 231% 208% 
1958-1965 134% 139% 93% 98% 127% 140% 122% 
        
Panel C - Asset growth period to different dates 
        
1950-1967 568% 730% 585% 448% 442% 534% 551% 
1950-1958 108% 128% 166% 92% 87% 91% 112% 
1960-1965 53% 69% 37% 50% 52% 55% 53% 
        
Panel D- Other information 
        
Established 194451 1863 1884 1848 1847 1853 1857 





1948 1959 1952 1961 1948 1937 1951 
 
 Source: Building Society Association, Yearbook (1950 to 1968) and own estimates.
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Table 3: Performance of Gross and Net Reserves, 1950-67 
Year  Abbey  Alliance Co-operative Leeds Woolwich Halifax Average 
   National    Permanent Permanent Equitable     
        
Panel A – “Gross” Reserves = Total reserves / total assets  
        
1950 5.4% 2.2% 4.6% 6.7% 5.4% 5.8% 5.0% 
1951 5.1% 2.2% 4.6% 6.4% 5.1% 5.5% 4.8% 
1952 4.7% 2.2% 4.3% 6.0% 4.9% 5.2% 4.6% 
1953 4.3% 2.3% 3.9% 5.9% 4.8% 5.1% 4.4% 
1954 3.9% 2.2% 3.6% 5.5% 4.3% 5.0% 4.1% 
1955 3.9% 2.1% 3.2% 5.3% 4.2% 4.5% 3.9% 
1956 3.8% 2.2% 3.0% 5.2% 4.1% 4.2% 3.8% 
1957 3.8% 2.2% 2.9% 5.1% 4.1% 3.8% 3.6% 
1958 3.6% 2.7% 2.7% 5.1% 4.3% 3.5% 3.6% 
1959 3.7% 3.1% 2.9% 5.2% 4.3% 3.6% 3.8% 
1960 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 5.4% 4.0% 3.5% 3.9% 
1961 3.6% 3.7% 3.3% 5.5% 4.0% 3.6% 3.9% 
1962 3.6% 3.5% 3.3% 5.5% 3.9% 3.6% 3.9% 
1963 3.5% 3.2% 3.4% 5.3% 3.9% 3.7% 3.8% 
1964 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 4.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.8% 
1965 3.5% 3.1% 3.4% 4.7% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 
1966 3.4% 3.1% 3.3% 4.3% 3.6% 3.7% 3.6% 
1967 3.2% 3.0% 3.3% 4.0% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 
        
 Average 
1959-67 
3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 5.0% 3.8% 3.6% 3.8% 
        
Panel B - Net reserves / net total assets  
        
1959 3.6% 2.5% 2.3% 5.2% 3.2% 3.6% 3.4% 
1960 3.2% 2.9% 2.7% 5.2% 2.9% 3.5% 3.4% 
1961 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 5.4% 2.8% 3.6% 3.5% 
1962 3.6% 3.4% 3.4% 5.4% 3.9% 3.6% 3.9% 
1963 3.5% 3.1% 3.5% 5.4% 3.9% 3.7% 3.8% 
1964 3.4% 3.1% 3.4% 5.0% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 
1965 3.4% 3.0% 3.5% 3.9% 3.5% 3.7% 3.5% 
1966 3.4% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.2% 3.7% 3.4% 
1967 3.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.2% 
        
Average 3.4% 3.0% 3.1% 4.7% 3.4% 3.6% 3.5% 
Source: Building Society Association, Yearbook (1950 to 1968) and own estimates. 










Source: Cassell (1984: 121) and own estimates. 
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 Table 4: Balance Sheet of the Co-operative Permanent Building Society, 1959-60 
  Abridged Balance Sheet at year ended (31-Dec-1959) (31-Dec-1960) 
  Liabilities    
      
    Number of shareholders              407,701            423,428  
 Due to shareholders       197,249,613     205,726,556 
   Num of shareholders (holding each in excess of £5k)                   144  n/d 
   Due to shareholders (holding each in excess of £5k)          2,883,333  n/d 
   Number of depositors               14,125              14,332  
 Due to depositors        12,070,728        10,740,661 
   Num of shareholders (holding each in excess of £5k)                   285  n/d 
   Due to depositors (holding each in excess of £5k)          7,653,912  n/d 
 Exchequer Loans          2,757,177        11,994,335 
 Bank Loans                       -                       -  
 Other Liabilities          2,335,582          2,669,559 
  Income Tax n/d         2,260,041 
  Profits Tax n/d           207,384  
  Sundry creditors n/d           202,134  
 Provisions              255,716                     -    
Current Liabilities       214,668,816     231,131,111 
Total Reserves           6,418,160         8,125,346 
 Special Reserves n/d                    -    
 Reserves and Balance c/f n/d         8,125,346 
  Reserves          6,200,000  n/d 
  Mortgage Losses - Reserve             218,160  n/d 
  Balance c/f                     -    n/d 
Sum          221,086,976     239,256,457 
  Assets    
   Num of mortage borrowers             163,535            171,302  
 Mortages not exceeding £5k       175,152,628     186,933,982 
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   Num of borrowers not exceeding £5k             164,163  n/d 
 Mortages exceeding £5k          6,865,606  n/d 
   Num of borrowers exceeding £5k                   458  n/d 
   From Bodies Corporate n/d         6,794,014 
   Excluding Bodies Corporate n/d         1,453,554 
 Mortgages over 12 months in possession                     -    n/d 
   Number of mortgages over 12 months in possession                     -    n/d 
   Number of mortagages over 12 months in arrears                     31  n/d 
 Mortagages over 12 months in arrears               52,787  n/d 
 Advances during the year        33,384,940        35,430,428 
   Num of borrowers each with more than one mortgage and total debt over £25k                     26  n/d 
 Borrowers each with more than one mortgage and total debt over £25k          3,532,013  n/d 
 Receiverships of over 12 months' standing               19,277  n/d 
 Less Mortgage Losses Provisions              25,000              20,000  
Mortgage Assets        182,046,021     195,161,550 
Trustees Investments        35,164,839       37,738,293 
 Quoted investments        24,162,606        30,874,231 
   Market value of quoted Trustees Investments        23,038,258        28,898,559 
  Unquoted and interest accrued          8,433,745          6,864,062 
   Unquoted n/d         6,555,985 
   Interest accrued n/d           308,077  
  Tax reserve certificate and Treasury Bills                     -    n/d 
  Cash at Bank and in Hand          2,568,488          2,556,127 
 Offices Premises and Equipment          3,683,959          3,204,430 
 Other Assets             192,157            596,147  
 Post War Credits n/d                    -    
Sum          221,086,976     239,256,547 
      
   n/d = Not disclosed in fiscal year 1959 or 1960, respectively.  
  Source: Building Society Association Yearbook and own estimates.  
 Table 5: Revenue and Appropriation Account of the Co-operative Permanent Building Society, 1959-60 
    1959 1960     1959 1960 
APPROPRIATION   REVENUE    
 Management Expenses    Interest on Mortgages  10,731,227   11,205,502 
  Director's Fees         15,000          15,000   Other amounts paid by Borrowers               -                  -    
  Remuneration and Travelling Expenses  n/d        855,166   Interest and Dividends from Investments    1,070,137     1,199,544 
   Remuneration of Staff and Auditors       753,186   n/d   Bank Interest         35,364          54,801 
   Travelling and Other Staff Expenses         73,144   n/d   Rents, etc, from letting of Office Premises       106,515        118,498 
  Office Accommodation and Expenses       205,086        305,512   Survey Fees and Expenses       150,390        175,661 
  Printing, Stationary, Postages and Telephone       111,731   n/d   Fines                -     
  Advertising         90,651          27,722   Other Fees, Rules and Pass Books         34,579          39,606 
  Commissions and Agency Fees         93,473          76,512   Commissions (Fire, Life, etc Insurance)       120,029        175,661 
  Contributions for meeting losses by Investors  n/d                -          
  Other Expenses               -                  -     Other Income          17,014 
   Legal and Professional Fees          9,312          26,980    Discount on Treasury Bills         49,734   n/d  
   Sundry Expenses         21,630          33,073    Sundry Receipts         18,721   n/d  
 Total Management Expenses    1,373,213     1,339,965        
 Survey Fees and Expenses payable to Directors               -                  -          
 Other Survey Fees and Expenses       115,000        136,364        
 Interest on Deposits and Loans       353,238        526,179        
 Interest on Loans and Overdrafts from Bank               -                  -          
 Losses on Mortgages (as per Mortgage Account)               -                  -          
 Depreciation       151,579          80,291        
  Office Premises, Furniture, etc.  n/d          24,254        
  Other Assets  n/d          56,037        
 Other Expenditure  10,323,666   10,903,488        
 Income Tax for 1959/60  and 1960/61    3,025,000     3,176,000        
 Profits Tax for period ended 31 December       155,000        200,000        
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 Interest, Dividend and Bonus to Shareholders    6,362,242     6,592,130        
 Balance Carried Down       781,424        935,358        
Sum     12,316,696   12,986,287       12,316,696   12,986,287 
 Balance (Loss) brought forward from last year               -                  -     Balance (Loss) brought forward from last year       112,687        218,160 
 Additional provision for Income Tax         50,000                -     Balance brought down       781,424        935,358 
 Other Debits and Appropriations    Other Credits and Appropriations [discretionary]   
  Transfer to Provisions for losses on Mortgage               -                350    Transfer from Mortgage Losses Provision             536   n/d  
  Transfer to General Reserve Account    1,300,000     1,800,000    Transfer from General Reserve Account       650,000   n/d  
 Balance Carried Forward       218,160        125,436    Surplus on sale of premises          3,899        424,484 
        Proceeds of sales of leases               -            16,842 
        Surplus on sale of investments         19,614          75,226 
        Transfer of amount set aside for future taxation        255,716 
       Balance (Loss) carried forward               -     n/d  
            
Sum       1,568,160     1,925,786         1,568,160     1,925,786 
            
  n/d = Not disclosed in fiscal year 1959 or 1960, respectively.        
            
 Source: Form AR 11 - Annual Return to Registrar of Friendly Societies (National Archives, Kew FS 14/599) and own estimates    
 Notes 
                                                 
1 Report of the BSA Council, 1959-60, paragraph 1, p. 5. 
2 ‘Building Society Innovation’, The Times, 05-Jan-1961, pg. 14. The loan allowed to see through the 
amalgamation of the Borrow-on-Soar with a larger society (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1961: 13-
14).  
3 The Treasury had to be informed and had to sanction any long term investment in building societies 
above the prescribed limit (eventually increased to £7,000 in 1964) as well as any loan above £10,000. 
In any event it was customary for the CPBS board (rather than individual managers) to consider any 
advance of £2,000 or greater. The latter limit was to increase with house inflation as the average 
individual mortgage loan at the CPBS moved from £895 in 1955 to £1,945 in 1967. 
4 This was the approach adopted by Shull (1963: 357), that is, the first analytical framework which 
proposes the use of marginal costing as an application of neo-classical economics to banking. See 
further Bradley and Cane (1975). 
5 Section 40(2) of the 1960 Act gave Sir Cecil Crabbe, the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, with 
the consent of the Treasury, the power to determine, by statutory instrument (S.I. 1960 No. 1826), the 
particulars to be included in the balance sheet and revenue and appropriation account of individual 
building societies. Section 50(3) of the Act made the same provision regarding the contents of the 
Annual Return to the Chief Registrar (S.I. 1960 No. 1827). 
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